For more than seven decades, international trade has relied on a set of shared rules, arbitral institutions, and the foundational idea that all countries pursued the same goals and played on the same playing field. Multilateralism, imperfect but useful, offered stability, predictability, and a legal framework for resolving disputes. That world has ceased to exist.
The globalization we have known since the 1990s, on the other hand, has entered a phase of radical transformation. It hasn't collapsed, but it is no longer governed by universal principles. It is governed by asymmetrical relationships, bilateral pressures and implicit threats. It is being reorganized around power, not consensus.
The United States, for decades the architect and main beneficiary of the multilateral order, has decided to change the rules. Not on a whim, but out of strategic necessity. Its hegemony, although still intact in the financial and military spheres, faces a systemic challenge: the rise of China.
Beijing has ceased to be the "workshop of the world" and has become a hegemonic actor in key points of the global supply chain. It controls critical sectors such as telecommunications, intermediate chemicals, consumer electronics, robotics, and strategic mining. It dominates global maritime traffic and port control. It aims to become a hegemonic power in the training of artificial intelligence models. Furthermore, it expands its political and economic influence in Asia, Africa and Latin America through direct investment, with no political conditionality.
Faced with this rise, the United States is no longer seeking efficiency, but resilience. The brutal example of Germany, which saw its economy collapse when Russia decided to cut off the flow of natural gas, has not gone unnoticed by American leaders. The country has gone from "just in time" to "just in case". What is at stake is not just growth, but economic security. Washington wants to secure access to critical technologies, rebuild industrial capacity, and not depend on a strategic rival for its essential supplies. In that context, multilateralism ceases to be useful. Shared norms become a hindrance. Arbitration institutions are perceived as ineffective. And trade policy becomes part of defense policy.
What is emerging is not a new consensus, but a form of economic vassalage. To achieve security of supply, priority should be given to "reshoring" or, failing that, "friendshoring". Multilateral institutions will play an increasingly anecdotal role. Two great feudal lords are emerging: The United States and China. The feudal lord demands absolute loyalty from his vassals, periodic tributes, and constant availability. In return, it offers protection, access to the lord's resources, and internal political autonomy.
Just as in Game of Thrones, nations must choose which lord to serve. Not doing so is also an option, but not without consequences. The European Union aspires to act as an intermediate power, as a hinge between blocs. But its energy, digital and military dependence reduces its real autonomy. India wants to maintain its neutrality, but will also be forced to align itself on critical issues. Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia will be disputed territories, not arbiters of the system.
The most likely consequence is the structural fragmentation of global trade. Two technological blocs, two payment systems, two stores of value, and two parallel regulatory architectures will emerge. Each will prioritize different principles: one, individual freedoms; The other, stability and social control. Both have their advantages. Neither will be perfect.
This new order is not being announced. It's becoming the norm. Decisions are no longer made in Geneva, Brussels, or New York. They are made in bilateral calls, warning letters, blacklists, and conditional agreements. Old treaties are being replaced by temporary pacts, dependent on the will of the lord.
Multilateralism is not officially dead. But it has been gutted from the inside. Instead, an architecture of forced loyalties, selective privileges, and strategic dependence emerges. Power is no longer shared. It is exercised.
Winter is here. But this time the battle is not fought with swords, but with tariffs, electronic chips and supply contracts. This geostrategic logic will also extend beyond Trump's term, because the United States really has no other viable options to curb China's rise. And the rest of the world will have to learn to live under that structural tension.